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Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), from a death sentence to a chronic disease. Drug firms argue that patents are not a barrier to access to the new drug therapy, because of tiered or compassionate pricing, and that patents are key mechanisms to encourage research and development of new medicines and vaccines.
Most of the studies on patents and pricing focus on the effect of patent expiration on drug pricing and shares in the US: Hurwitz and Caves (1988) ; Caves, Whinston and Hurwitz (1991) ; Grabowski and Vernon (1992) ; Frank and Salkever (1992, 1997) ; Griliches and Cockburn (1994) ; Hellerstein (1994) and, Fisher and Griliches (1995) . Hudson (1992 and analyzes drug pricing dynamics and patent expiration not only in the US, but also in the UK, Germany, France, and Japan. A common finding F o r P e e r R e v i e w 3 of these papers is that the larger the numbers of competitors, the lower drug prices are, and that brand name products might even increase in price after the introduction of generics. This is what Scherer (1993) named the "generic paradox."
Very little attention has been devoted to studying the impact of patent rights on drug pricing in developing countries. Some papers attempt to simulate the likely effects of product patents on average drug prices in developing countries. In the cases of Argentina and India, Challu (1991) , Fink (2000) , and Watal (2000) obtain impacts of patents on average prices of a different order. Impacts of about 200% are obtained by using the assumptions that yield the highest impact and of 26% (Watal, 2000) , or as low as 12% (Fink, 2000) , with the assumptions that yield the lowest impact. Using less detailed data, Maskus and Eby-Konan (1994) and Subramanian (1995) obtain maximum price increases of up to 67% due to the introduction of pharmaceutical product patent rights.
Another stream of works has focused on studying the dynamics of drug pricing. Lu and Comanor (1998) described that there are two different pricing strategies in the drug markets. The pricing strategy named "skimming strategy" corresponds to what Lu and Comanor (1998) found to be the pricing strategy for the subset of drugs which represent important therapeutic gains, as opposed to the "penetration strategy" that Lu and Comanor (1998) found to be the pricing strategy for the subset of drugs which largely duplicate the actions currently available products.
In the skimming strategy cases, drug firms introduce their products at high price which later on declines. In the penetration strategy cases, drug firms introduce their products at low price which later on increases. The literature on experience goods (those whose users determine product attributes only by using the product) explains when pioneering brands try to build up their consumer base and their reputation by a low/high F o r P e e r R e v i e w 4 pricing sequence (Schmalensee, 1982) , and also when monopolists prefer instead to "milk its reputation" using a high/low pricing sequence (Shapiro, 1983) . The key issue in this literature is the buyer's perceptions of the new product quality. When consumers are pessimistic regarding the product quality, the firms needs to build the reputation of the product largely by setting a low introductory price followed by a higher regular price.
When consumers overestimate product quality, the firm will optimally set a high launch price but then lower its price over time. 1 This paper tries to fill part of the gap in the empirical literature on drug pricing. It investigates the impact of patents on pricing of HIV/AIDS drugs in a sample of low and middle-income countries in the late 1990's. This is a companion paper to that by Borrell and Watal (2002) on studying patents and access to HIV/AIDS drugs. The hypothesis is that drug prices are higher under patent regimes. Patents legally prevent unauthorized manufacture, sale, importation, and using or stocking for sale of the patented product during a limited term. Patents prevent competition between the innovator of the drug (and any of its licensees) and the imitators (unauthorized providers). Patents prevent competition between providers of products that contain the same therapeutically active substance, and that only differ slightly in other characteristics. The lack of such close competitors is expected to shift prices upward.
Additionally, this paper studies how the pricing dynamics differ across patent regimes. We expect pricing strategies to differ strongly across patent regimes. Patents allow drug firms to get the most from skimming and penetration strategies. By contrast, pricing in no-patent regimes will be more closely linked to the dynamics of production costs and competition.
1 Bagwell and Riordan (1991) analyze the case in which the firms signal high quality new products with prices that are above full information profit maximizing prices. As information about the prices diffuses, the price distortion disappears. This paper uses sales data on HIV/AIDS drugs in a sample of 34 low and middle-income countries, between 1995 and mid-2000, and reduced form regressions to empirically assess the impact of market exclusivity on pricing of clinically tested ARV drug bundle (so called "cocktail therapy").
Our main finding is that the daily dose price of any "cocktail therapy" differs significantly in two dimensions: (1) drug bundles are on average more expensive when they include products under patent regime, and (2) drug bundles are on average more expensive when they include products under licenses from the firm that originally developed the drug. We also find a positive relationship between drug prices and per capita income in both patent and non-patent regimes. This finding suggests, that not only competition under non-patent regimes drives drug prices to be related to per capita income across countries, but also that multinational drug firms have effectively tiered their prices to per capita income across countries when drugs are under patent regime.
Finally, we find that drug firms set a very high initial price and then lower it over time during the 9-year period after the date the drug bundle was available on the US market only in patent regimes. This pricing strategy, named skimming pricing (as opposed to penetration pricing), corresponds to what Lu and Comanor (1998) found to be the pricing strategy for drugs, which represent important therapeutic gains.
Competition prevents price discrimination in no-patent regimes. This paper is organized in the following way: section 2 describes the method we follow to test whether patents have a positive or negative effect on pricing, and the characteristics of the data set. Section 3 offers some descriptive statistics on patents and prices. Section 4 shows the results of estimating the impact of patents on pricing. Section 5 concludes. 
Methodology
There are large number of studies in economics that use natural experiments or quasiexperiment designs to examine outcome measurements for observations in treatment groups and comparison groups. Meyer (1995) describes the strengths and weaknesses of using quasi-experiments in economics. Among good natural experiments, Meyer (1995) cites those induced by policy changes that may allow a researcher to obtain exogenous variation in the main explanatory variables. This paper uses the difference approach in a quasi-experiment to study how the outcome of interest -i.e. drug pricing, -differs for treatment groups and comparison groups that are not randomly assigned. The treatment group contains all the countrydrug pairs for which any ARV drug, in the country of a sample of developing countries, is under a patent regime, while the comparison group contains all the country-drug pairs for which the drug is not under a patent regime. Quasi-experiments allow us to distinguish the effects of exogenous variation in an explanatory variable that is, in other situations, endogenously related to the outcome of interest. The estimates of the effect of patents on drug prices are usually biased because drug firms apply for patent status across countries and drugs in a non-random way. Drug firms apply and renew the patent status of a particular drug in a given country only when both of the two following conditions hold: (1) when the firm may legally obtain a patent right from the government of that particular country (what we will refer to as the "patent regime") for the drug and (2) when the present discounted value of the expected cash flow of patenting that drug in that country is positive (what we will refer to as the firm "patenting decision"). 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  P  e  e  r  R  e  v  i  e  w   7 This paper overcomes the bias by studying the effect of a policy change on the patent regime of a set of HIV/AIDS drugs and country pairs on the outcome of interest -i.e. drug pricing. The key identifying assumption in the study is that differences in patent regimes across drug-country pairs are exogenous with respect to the outcomes in the market for ARV drugs. The paper sustains that patent law changes in the countries sampled were driven mainly by bilateral or international agreements and national developments, rather than by concerns related to the treatment of HIV patients.
As Meyer (1995) highlights, three of the main goals of the research design should be: (1) having a large enough variation in the key explanatory variables so that it is exogenous, (2) finding comparison groups that are comparable, (3) probing the implications of the hypotheses under test.
With respect to the first issue, this paper identifies the factors that drove changes in the patent regime to rule out obvious sources of endogeneity. Each drug-country patent regime indicator depends on two data: (1) whether patent protection is locally available and, (2) when the innovator can apply for patent protection in any of the World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries. The differences in patent regimes across countries, and the timing of the invention of the 14 different ARV molecules (from 1985 to 1995) lead to an appropriate mix of patent regimes across drug-country-pairs.
With respect to the second issue, this paper uses different regression specifications including different sets of controls to avoid the possibility of omitted variables, trends in outcomes and omitted interactions to examine the comparability of treatment groups and comparison groups. In the regression analysis, we treat omitted variables, trends in outcomes and omitted interactions by controlling for relevant country characteristics, and also country, brand licensing status (licensed brands versus nonlicensed brands), pharmaceutical form, and annual fixed effects, and country and year This study of the impact of patent on prices differs from that conducted by Scherer and Watal (2001) in three aspects. First, we study the effect of the patent regime indicator on all firms pricing, not only on multinationals. Second, the patent regime indicator has been improved with respect to that used by them. It includes data on patent rights, exclusive marketing rights (EMR), and 'pipeline protection' available to innovators across countries and drugs as explained below. Finally, instead of regressing the price of each product on a set of country and drug effects, we regress the price of each clinically tested bundle of drugs available in any given country and year, on a set of characteristics including the patent regime indicator. This is important because ARV drugs have strong complementarities in consumption. Effective therapies are usually cocktail therapies combining two or three different drugs. Equilibrium prices are likely to be related to the dosage, efficacy and adverse reactions of each bundle of drugs that is actually available to the AIDS patients in a given country and year.
Data
Treatment of AIDS in rich countries changed dramatically after 1995, when new, more effective, and safer drugs were approved. According to Henkel (1999) , the combination In the countries not providing patents to eligible drugs before 1 st January 1995, TRIPS obligations do not affect drugs that were no longer "new" for patenting purposes as of the date of filing in that country, or as of the date of priority accorded to them upon request. Therefore, we can conclude that all WTO Members would be obliged to make patents (or exclusive marketing rights) available to inventions for which the first patent application was made in any WTO member on or after 1 st January 1994.
8
"Mailbox" applications do not have to be examined until the local patent law is passed. However, when a drug subject to a "mailbox application" obtains marketing approval before the local patent office makes a decision on whether granting a patent right or not, the following special rule applies: An Exclusive Marketing Right (EMR) of up to five years (or until the patent is granted or rejected, whichever is shorter) must be granted from the date of local marketing approval, provided that a patent has been filed for that drug and a patent and marketing approval obtained in another WTO member country after 1 st January 1995. 8 An invention is considered to be new if it does not form part of the state of the art. The "state of the art" is generally defined, as everything made available to the public by means of a written or oral description, by use, or in any other way, before the date of filing of the patent application.
Under WTO rules, incorporating existing WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization)
conventions, for purposes of determining novelty, patent applicants may claim the priority of an earlier application made during the period of 12 months from the date of filing. It is theoretically possible to have a patent applicant not to claim priority from the date of an earlier filing and to claim that products for which patent applications were filed elsewhere from say, mid-1993 are We lacked direct data on patents granted for each of the 14 different ARV molecules in each country. Therefore, we assessed instead the patent regime for each drug-country pair. We gathered information on whether product patents for pharmaceuticals were available in each country for a year after each ARV product patent application was filed in according to the key priority date given in the US.
Balasubramaniam (2000) provides the date of filing of the patent application, which the US Patent and Trademark Office reports as the key patent for each ARV.
9
Using a variety of sources, including local legislation and the complete cross-country data-set compiled by Qian (2001), we obtained the hypothetical date from which patent protection for pharmaceuticals could have been granted for each drug in each one of the 34 countries of our sample.
We built up the patent regime indicator using the key patent priority date and the date from which each country could have granted patent protection. For each drugcountry-pair, we assessed whether product patents would have been available locally within a year from the key priority date of each molecule. TRIPS provisions on exclusive novel (since later than this date the application would then be published by another patent office after 18 months and so would no longer be novel as of or after January 1995), but we believe that this is unlikely to happen in practice. Remember that the patent regime indicator does not report whether the innovator was granted or had even applied for patent protection for each drug-countrypair of our sample. In other words, it does not reflect the actual patent status of the drug.
It only shows that patent or other market exclusivity status was attainable for some years, to the best of our knowledge. So, the patent regime is arguably exogenous to any firm decision. Taking into account the value of patent protection, innovators may decide whether or not it pays to apply in each one of the countries that make available such rights. Table 4 shows that the minimum price per annual triple drug bundle in 1999 was higher than the per capita income in $PPP in all the countries of the sample except in Brazil (47% of per capita income), Argentina (58%) and Chile (81%), while the minimum price was 21% of the per capita income in the US. All minimum prices of single and double drug bundles are smaller than the minimum price in the US, particularly in India, Thailand, Brazil, and South Africa.
We also matched each local product to an equivalent product in the US using data on the minimum list price in the US. 11 In 1995, sales weighted mean prices were 11 As reported in the Red Book (1995, 1996, 1997, 1999 and 2000) , the PDR-Generics (1997), and PDR-CG (1998, 1999 and 2000) . We matched each local price with the US minimum What are the drivers of the pricing dynamics? Table 6 shows that the cumulative annual decrease in the sales weighted mean price in current $US between 1995 and 1999 (column 1) is driven by three factors: (1) the introduction of cheaper new products particularly in India, Uruguay, French West Africa, and Malaysia (column 2); (2) the drop in nominal prices in current $US for the drugs already on the market, particularly in Central America, the Philippines, South Africa, and Peru (column 3); which in turn is mainly driven by (3) the depreciation of the exchange rate between the local, and the US currency, particularly in the Philippines, South Africa, and Peru (column 4). (column 2) to offset the negative impact of local inflation (column 3). Table 8 shows summary statistics of the variables used in the regression analysis. The dependent variable in the pricing regressions is the log of the price per daily dose of any clinically tested drug bundle available to patients in any country, in any year. There are 2,459 clinically proven one-drug, two-drug, or three-drug bundles available to AIDS patients in our data set. The right hand side variables of interest in the pricing regressions are the dummies that are equal to 1 when (1) the bundles include at least one original drug in a patent regime, (2) when the bundles includes at least one original drug in a nopatent regime, and (3) when the bundles includes at least a generic in a patent regime.
Results
The omitted category is the case when all the drugs in the bundle are local copies introduced in no patent regimes.
We control for different vectors of price shifters. Table 9 shows the results from estimating different specifications of the pricing equation. In column (1) we include the country mean income, the country income inequality, the dosage, the efficacy, the adverse reactions of each bundle, and the fixed effects related to the number of years since the drug bundle was available in the US (1…12), the number of drugs contained in each bundle (1, 2 or 3), pharmaceutical form (oral solid, oral liquid, vials), years (1995…1999), and a fixed effect for controlling when the data also includes hospital sales. In column (2) we add a set of country fixed effects. In column (3), we add to this latter specification a set of country-year pair effects. Table 11 shows that drug bundles containing at least one original drug in a patent regime are on average priced 70% higher than drug bundles containing only local copies marketed in no patent regimes.
Table 11 also shows that drug bundles containing at least one generics marketed in a patent regime (probably when the drug goes off patent in country-drugs previously under patent regime) are on average priced 22% higher then drug bundles containing only local copies. Moreover, drug bundles containing at least one original drug are priced 16% higher than local copies even when it is introduced in no-patent regimes. Panels B, C and D show the estimates of these price differences using the results in Table 10 .
These results show that patients have access to cheaper drug bundles, and to a wider range of prices in no-patent regimes i.e., drug bundles containing only cheaper local or generic non-licensed brands rather than bundles containing more expensive big pharma brands. That is the expected result from the competition among different firms offering drugs that contain the same chemical entities on the market. For instance, we observe that in a no-patent regime such as the corresponding to the country-drug pair Argentina-Zidovudine eight firms compete offering close substitute brands.
Results also show that competition of just one generic firm at the end of the patent term also induces a reduction of prices. For instance, a generic Canadian firm show that big pharma licensed brands are priced differently across patent regimes.
Tables 9 also show that the prices across countries are closely related to each country per capita income and income inequality. More importantly, the positive link between prices and mean income is persistent across patent regimes, and gets stronger for drug bundles containing more drugs. The relationship between prices and income inequality is ambiguous, probably because the functional form is too restrictive to handle the non-linearity relationship between prices and income distribution. However, these results are consistent with the assumption that price relatives depend not only on the degree of differentiation among products on the market, but also on the income distribution of each country, the characteristics of the outside good, and the marginal and fixed costs of production.
Finally, tables 9 and 10 show that launch prices are very high, and that drug bundle prices adjust down strongly. Figure one uses the results of a regression using country-year fixed effects and allowing for different time trends for single, double and triple therapies to predict the evolution of mean prices across the life cycle of the products. The figure shows that drug firms use the so called "skimming strategy" when pricing new drug in the case of original drugs in patent-regimes. This is the pricing strategy named "skimming strategy." More should be studied to understand the fundamentals of this strategy, particularly, whether and why drug firms are discriminating prices intertemporally and across countries.
Page 19 of 35
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 F o r P e e r R e v i e w 20
Submitted Manuscript

Conclusions
Our main finding is that the average daily dose price of any ARV "cocktail therapy" differs significantly between the treatment group of country-drug pairs in which pharmaceutical firms may apply for product patent rights, and the comparison group of country-drug pairs in which pharmaceutical firms may not apply for product patent rights. We find that on average cocktail therapies are more expensive when they include big pharma licensed brand products.
Additionally, we find evidence of a persistent relationship between drug prices and per capita income under patent and no-patent regimes, and a strong decreasing trend in prices. Sales-weighted average ARV prices were quite close to US average prices in all countries by 1995. By mid-2000, these prices had dropped significantly in current $US.
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